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The paper aims at comparing the recent findings of neurosciences with the 
phenomenological approach as regards the multifaceted relationship between self 
as consciousness and self as subjectivity. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful 
consideration of the issues concerning the constitution of mental life, offers a precious 
chance to set the scientific results in an authentically philosophical outlook.  
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As Gallagher and Zahavi explain in Chapter 3 of their analytic study, 
consciousness always involves the moment of self-consciousness, which 
has “to be understood as an intrinsic feature of the primary experience” 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 53). This character of internality means that 
self-consciousness is given prior to the reflection upon it: for this reason, 
the authors rightly stress its pre-reflective mark. This givenness is worth 
investigating, considering that the fact that self-consciousness precedes 
any observation or inference one can address to it doesn’t entail that one 
is not able to be aware of it, but rather that one can be immediately aware 
of it. According to Goldman quoted in the text, it is “a non-reflective self-
awareness” (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 51). 
Thus “pre-reflective” signifies a peculiar givenness of this inner feature of 
the primary experience, because “prior to reflection” doesn’t mean “prior 
to consciousness”, albeit the consciousness’ domain is implicitly referred to 
the reflective one, but it indicates an original possession of myself by myself, 
a possession that I feel before knowing it, just to reflect on it (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2008, p. 49). 
In one of his previous studies on these issues, Dan Zahavi has clearly stressed 
the relevance and the complexity of the relation between the pre-reflective 
level and the reflective one: since both share the dimension of consciousness 
as a location of their development, they improve a peculiar form of 
interdependency. 
This in turn is not symmetric, because “the act of reflection is itself a 
prereflectively self-given act”, and for this reason it “must also already be 
prereflectively self-aware, since it is this that permits it to recognize the 
reflected act as belonging to the same subjectivity as itself” (Zahavi 1999, p. 
56). The question of the reference of the reflecting act to its pre-reflective 
root is of basic importance from a phenomenological standpoint, because 
it deals not only with the essence of the method, but also with the status of 
Ego as performer of such a method. If one identifies the egological level only 
with the reflective one, it becomes hard to affirm that the pre-reflective 
sphere is self-aware: how is it possible to talk about a self, which is in turn 
not an I? But on the other hand, if one attributes the egological trait both to 
the reflective and to the pre-reflective consciousness’ grade, it is possible to 
question not only the legitimacy, but also the necessity of something like the 
phenomenological method: why should I carry on a reflection on myself, if I 
am self-aware already as pre-reflecting? 
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To exit from this antinomy, one has to come back to the fundamental 
distinction Gallagher and Zahavi make between feeling and knowing, where the 
latter only is linked to the authentically egological level of self-aware (the one 
of the method), while the former describes the immediate experience of self: 
“When I am aware of a current pain, perception, or thought, the experience 
in question is given immediately, non-inferentially, and non-criterially as 
mine”; it means that “I am usually able to respond immediately, i.e. without 
inference or observation, if somebody asks me what I have been doing, or 
thinking, or seeing, or feeling immediately prior to the question” (Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2008, p. 54). The central mark of the pre-reflective self-awareness 
is thus its present occurring, which involves simultaneity of experiencing 
(perceiving, being in pain, thinking) and being aware of it. 
If I cannot doubt a self as mine when I am currently experiencing something 
I am living now, because I feel prior to knowing that I am experiencing, what 
happens to past experiences? If to the question “are you in pain?”, i.e. “are 
you as your-self in pain?”, I am able to answer immediately “Yes, I am – as 
my-self”, since I am simultaneously feeling in pain, can I show the same 
confidence to the answer “Are you – as your-self – the one who was in pain?”? 
In this case I am not feeling in pain, but I should remember to have been in 
pain, and so I should know that I as my-self I am the same who was before in 
pain and remembers it now, and that the pain was and is always mine. From 
where does this knowledge derive? Which is its legitimacy, considering that 
it lacks the grounding trait of immediacy? The question is linked to the last, 
which has elapsed between the experienced pain and the remembered one, 
and so such a question must find a solution related to its temporal mark. 
The difficulty which remains, in any case, open is the following: where, i.e. 
in which point of self-consciousness, is there something like becoming Ego? 
In order to try to point out a possible answer to such an intricate matter, one 
can joint the phenomenological standpoint on this fundamental issue to some 
recent neuroscientist approaches, relying upon the fruitful interconnection 
between both accounts. 
Antonio Damasio, among others, has stressed this constantly developing state 
of self, which roots in her temporal constitution: “What is happening to us 
now is, in fact, happening to a concept of self based on the past, including the 
past that was current only a moment ago. At each moment the state of self is 
constructed, from the ground up” (Damasio 2005, p. 240, second emphasis 
mine). This construction is not isolated from its experience context rather it 
is based upon precisely this context, which constitutes its living environment. 
According to Damasio, this environment consists of two different and 
reciprocal sets, the object and the organism which responds to the object, 
both producing specific images; the self as subject refers to these two sides of 
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the same living experience, but it doesn’t identify with nor reduce to that or 
the other, since “subjectivity emerges during the latter step when the brain is 
producing not just images of an object, not just images of organism responses 
to the object, but a third kind of image, that of an organism in the act of 
perceiving and responding to an object” (Damasio 2005, pp. 242-243). Thus 
subjectivity arises in the meeting point between object and experience of the 
object, and this point corresponding to the encounter of consciousness with 
something else means the authentic appearance of Ego; phenomenologically 
speaking, “we also focus on the subjective side of consciousness, thereby 
becoming aware of our subjective accomplishments and of the intentionality 
that is at play. If we want to understand how physical objects, mathematical 
models, chemical processes, social relations, or cultural artefacts can appear 
as they do, with the meaning they have, then we need to examine the 
experiencing subject to whom they appear” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 25). 
The temporal trait, which animates this subjective coming out, constitutes 
for Damasio a sort of autobiography, “a combination of memories of the past 
and of the planned future” (Damasio 2005, p. 239)1, and links up with the bodily 
side of experience, which represents the “basic”, i.e. “grounding” reference of 
self. Upon this basis the self is able to recollect her history which is developed 
until that moment, and this recollection takes place mainly as a nonverbal 
though narrative way, which uses “the elementary representational tools of the 
sensory and motor systems in space and time” (Damasio 2005, p. 243). Despite 
his stated disagreement with Gerald Edelman’s point of view due to the greater 
emphasis put on the primary consciousness, Damasio acknowledges, recalling 
the assertions by Edelman himself and Giulio Tononi2, that the “language may 
not be the source of the self, but it certainly is the source of the ‘I’” (Damasio 
2005, p. 243. See also Chomsky 1980, pp. 185-216). 
As a linguistic being, the Ego is ready to communicate her personal states, 
which means that the passage from the pre-reflection to self-consciousness 
1 This autobiographical trait contributing to the formation of self-identity is emphasized, 
among others, by Daniel Schacter, who points out the fact that “Psychologists have 
come to recognize that the complex mixtures of personal knowledge that we retain 
about the past are woven together to form life stories and personal myths. These are the 
biographies of self that provide narrative continuity between past and future – a set of 
memories that form the core of personal identity. […] [That fact] underlies our trust in 
autobiographical memory as a basis for self-understanding” (Schacter 1996, pp. 93 and 
101). See also Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), in particular pp. 200-202. 
2 “With the emergence of a higher-order consciousness through language, there is a 
consciously explicit coupling of feelings and values, yielding emotions with cognitive 
components that are experienced by a person - a self” (Edelman and Tononi 2000, pp. 204 
and 205, emphases mine).
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as I-consciousness is characterized by the openness to an alterity and 
therefore by the becoming a social consciousness. Husserl himself has clearly 
expressed the gradual transition from a pure egological sphere to a complete 
intersubjective world, via body (see Husserl 1989, pp. 103-230; Husserl 1999, 
p. 108 ff.). This involves the impossibility to conceive an isolated subject, a 
subject without relation with other subjects, but it involves nevertheless 
the necessity to start from a first-person account of mental life, in order not 
to fall in a solipsistic circle, but rather to enable talking also about subjects 
other than me: “When Husserl realized this, he abandoned his nonegological 
theory. Every conscious experience, even an anonymous one, belongs to a 
subject, i.e., either to me or to somebody else. It cannot belong to nobody” 
(Zahavi 1999, p. 143). As he asserts this research perspective, reaffirmed in his 
recent work (see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp. 40-41), Zahavi also recalls the 
same position expressed by Eduard Marbach in his analytical comment to the 
problem of I in Husserl (Marbach 1974)3.
To consider the environment which determines the process of experience 
of an I-consciousness implies going forward to talk about the social context 
where this experience is always communicated, tested, discussed, objected or 
acknowledged. The public characteristic of the subjective cognition as inborn 
part of the growth of consciousness is not something that occurs from the 
outside, but is an intrinsic feature of the phenomenon of becoming Ego4, i.e. 
of becoming a person. As such, this improvement starts from the beginning 
of one’s mental life, namely from the birth of individual consciousness (see 
Merleau-Ponty 1962). For this reason, the discourse about self-consciousness 
both in its pre-reflective and reflective levels involves always a speech about 
the others, with regard to the first steps of subjective growth: “While we 
cannot say when the ‘true subject’ starts, we can be sure that, from the birth, 
the baby is constructing his or her own ‘scenes’ via primary consciousness 
and that these scenes rapidly begin to be accompanied by the refurbishment 
of concepts through gesture, speech, and language. From the earliest 
times, the thought that accompanies language and that flowers with its 
development is likely to be metaphorical and narrative. […] According to this 
picture, internalism and externalism are too extreme – components of both 
3 With regard to this egological trait of inquiry, Eduard Marbach develops a very 
valuable point of view, which is able to treasure the findings of neuroscience within a 
phenomenological perspective (Marbach 1993, 2006).
4 “Self-alterity provides a fine tool to understand better that there is no exclusive 
alternative between ego and non-ego. The truth lies in a middle path, which can be 
called a self-altered ego. In that respect, ‘alterology’, being the science of such a self-
altered subjectivity, constitutes an inner alternative to egology” (Depraz and Cosmelli 
2003, p. 180, emphasis mine).
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play major roles in subjective development” (Edelman and Tononi 2000, p. 
198). It is possible to find an analogous consideration of social connection 
of individual consciousness as well as in some recent phenomenological 
analyses, which following the Husserlian investigations (Husserl 1970, 
pp. 178-186; Husserl 1973; Husserl 2006, pp. 79-86) assert the relevance 
of the intersubjective aspect of I-experience, and they root this aspect in 
the egological mind with mention also of studies regarding the children’s 
representational achievements (Kern and Marbach 2001) and their corporal 
way – emotional, sensorimotor, out or prior to any belief – to refer outwards 
(Gallagher 1996; Gallagher and Varela 2003, pp. 105-106; Gallagher and Zahavi 
2008, pp. 187-191; Zahavi 1999, pp. 174-180). 
The natural tendency of the individual level to transcend itself towards 
another already from the beginning of existence, like the reference to the 
infantile level of relationship to something else demonstrates, enables the 
progressive formation of the social dimension of life. This is primordially 
embedded in the bodily feature of the Ego, since “to exist embodied is to 
exist in such a way that one exists under the gaze of the other […]. Bodily 
behaviour, expression, and action are essential to […] some basic forms of 
consciousness” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 148). This means that the 
recognition of him/herself both as a conscious and self-conscious individual 
I finds in the social, public side of this cognition not only its counterpart 
or confirmation5, but rather the original location of self-manifestation as 
embodied subject, and so an experiential domain to describe and deal with in 
order to gain a more complete phenomenological account of the mind. 
Phenomenology, thanks to the analytical consideration of the issues 
regarding the constitution of mental life, which it describes with a specific 
focus on the interconnection between Ego and consciousness, offers a 
precious chance to set the scientific findings in a truly philosophical outlook.
5 Such a confirmation is depicted in a very compelling manner by the following 
James’s statements: “No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a 
thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain 
absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned round when we 
entered, answered when he spoke, or minded what he did, but if every person we met 
‘cut us dead’, and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent 
despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruellest bodily tortures would be 
a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not 
sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all” (James 1950, pp. 293-294). 
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